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I. INTRODUCTION

"Nations and peoples can lose their heads."'
On September 11, 2001, three hijacked jet airliners deliberately were
crashed into buildings in New York City and Washington, D.C. A fourth
aircraft, apparently intended for the same purpose, crashed into a field in
Pennsylvania.3 The lives of approximately three thousand persons were
snuffed out in a matter of barely over an hour,4 and another two thousand
families suffered direct physical and psychological injuries.' The
Pentagon, a building that houses the United States Department of Defense,
was significantly damaged. The World Trade Center towers, the tallest
structures in the City of New York, the emblems of the commercial and
* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank my colleagues,
Professors Penelope Andrews, Robert Condlin, Lee Hall, and Robert Suggs for their helpful
comments and editorial suggestions. I would also like to express my appreciation to the University
of Maryland School Library Research Fellow, Ryan Easley, for his research help. I am grateful to
the Florida Law Review and to its editors for the opportunity to participate in this colloquy, and for
making this a much more readable piece than it would have been otherwise. The errors, of course,
are mine.
1. Richard Cohen, Our ForgottenPanic, WASH. POST, July 22, 2004, at A21.
2. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE U.S., 108TH CONG., THE

9/11 COMM'N REPORT 1-14 (2004), availableathttp://www.9-1 lcommission.gov/reportlindex.htm

[hereinafter THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT].
3. Id. at 14.
4. Id. at 311,314.
5. See, e.g., David W. Chen, After Weighing Value ofLives 9/11 Fund Completes Its Task,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2004, at Al (reporting that more than five thousand families will receive
compensation from the federal government as a result of the September 11 attacks).
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financial primacy of that City-if not of the United States-were
destroyed completely. These were the acts, we have since learned, of a
group known as al Qaeda, a nongovernmental body headed by Osama bin
Laden, which, at least at the time of these events, sought as its primary
objective to expel the United States military from Saudi Arabia, bin
Laden's country of birth.6 But this information was not available to the
general public on September 11. Rather, in the dark as to the identities of
the perpetrators and their motivations, the proverbial "man in the street"
could only wonder and otherwise respond to the images of the collisions
of these symbols of America's technological prowess by resorting to his
primordial instincts: disbelief, awe, shock, and surprise. And beyond these,
there was a very important social response: the extension and expression
of empathy. Fear and the desire for revenge took a little longer to become
generalized.
More than three years removed from September 11, it may be difficult
to recall the universal empathy that these tragic events generated. The
immediate reaction of people across the United States and in much of the
world was to demonstrate their solidarity with the victims.' In gestures that
give meaning to the human collectivity as a social one, friends, neighbors,
and strangers alike by words, acts, and deeds made the sufferings of New
Yorkers, Washingtonians, and the American people theirs.' But while
ordinary individuals may be content to react to tragedy by sending e-mails,
making donations to relief funds, driving across the country to volunteer
in aid centers, and condemning the evil of terror, their political leaders
cannot resign themselves to dealing simply with the post hoc effects of
terrorism. They not only must punish wrongdoers, but also must prevent
future wrongful acts, or at least give the impression that they are doing so.
And so, within an hour of the first aircraft crashing into the World
Trade Center and within ten minutes after the President of the United
States was informed of the crash into the Pentagon, he reportedly said to
his Vice President: "'Sounds like we have a minor war going on
here ....We're at war ...somebody's going to pay."' 9 This became a

6. See THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 48; see also STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS:
THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION
TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001, at 17 (2004).

7. See, e.g., Jeff Giles, The Nation's Neighborhood,NEWSWEEK, Sept. 27, 2001, at 40
(describing examples of both individual and collective showings of empathy and solidarity both in
and outside the United States).
8. This sense of solidarity was memorably captured in the headline of a French daily: "Nous
Sommes Tous Amdricains" ("We are all Americans"). Jean Marie Colombani, Nous Sommes Tous
Amdricains,LE MONDE, Sept. 13, 2001; see also What We Think ofAmerica, GRANTA 77, Mar. 28,
2002 (collecting the empathetic views ofmany well-known international writers who ordinarily are
quite unsympathetic to the United States' geopolitical and cultural policies).
9. See THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 39 (alteration in original).
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persistent theme of the United States government's response to the events
of September 11. But, of course, "war"-whether metaphorical or
real-was by no means the sole available response to terror. Indeed, prior
to August 20, 1998, when President Clinton ordered the launching of
Tomahawk missiles against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation
for the bombing of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the
standard governmental response to terrorism had been rhetorical and
legal.'" The former approach held fast to the standard refrain "we do not
negotiate with terrorists,"" while the latter saw the adoption of numerous
international instruments aimed at suppressing particular types of terrorist
acts 2 as well as the massive expansion in municipal law of the concept of
protective extraterritorial jurisdiction to encompass the seizure of alleged
terrorists both on the high seas and in foreign countries."3 The terror
attacks of September 11, however, not only elicited a militaristic
declaration of "war" against terrorism, but also fundamentally altered both
the rhetorical and legal approaches. It is within this convention of an
altered landscape 4 that Professor Viet Dinh' s Dunwody Lecture should be
examined.
Accepting September 11 as an exceptional event, Dinh nonetheless sees
it as emblematic of an emerging new order (or, perhaps more accurately,

10. It is sometimes claimed that the military response to international terrorism dates back
to the bombing of Libya in 1986. See, e.g., Laurence R. Heifer, Transforming InternationalLaw
After the September11 Attacks? Three Evolving ParadigmsforRegulatingInternationalTerrorism,
in SEPTEMBER 11 INHISToRY: A WATERSHED MOMENT? 180, 185 (Mary L. Dudziak ed., 2003).
This claim, however, overlooks a crucial fact. United States action in 1986 was based on the
attribution of direct responsibility to the conduct of a government, and as Professor Dinh rightly
points out, war (or, more accurately, "international armed conflict") is the appropriate terminology
to describe the violent response of one government to the acts of another. Viet D. Dinh,
Nationalismin the Age of Terror,56 FLA. L. REV. 867, 874 (2004). By contrast, in 1998 and 2001,
the United States viewed al Qaeda as a distinct and autonomous entity from the governments
purportedly hosting it. The military response was to al Qaeda's acts, for which its hosts were only
indirectly responsible. The military responses in these latter cases thus genuinely constituted the
waging of"a different kind of war." See Richard J. Newman, et al., A Different Kind of War, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 1, 2001, at 30.
11. This became the standard policy of the United States under the Reagan Administration
and was invoked constantly by subsequent presidents. David Tucker, Responding to Terrorism,21
WASH. Q. 103, Winter 1998; Outfrom the Cellar,THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 1990, at A77 (U.K.).
12. See Conventions and Agreements cited infra note 37.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86-110 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090-92
(D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 192-203 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that the court can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over Mr. bin Laden and his
associates in prosecutions brought for the bombings of United States embassies in East Africa).
14. Since the attacks, the phrase "9/11 changed everything" has become a familiar refrain.
See SEPTEMBER I 1 iNHISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT'?, supra note 10 (evaluating the accuracy
of this claim from a multidisciplinary perspective).
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of a disorder).' 5 September 11, he says, represents an order in which
"[n]ation-states no longer possess a monopoly on warfare or war-like
violence"' 6 but must share that hitherto quintessential attribute of
statehood with "terrorists who believe fervently in their cause, but who
owe no allegiance to any particular place or polity."' 7 The attack on
September 11 was a challenge not only to the United States, but also to the
entire international system of states. Furthermore, the challenge to the
system, far from being at its peripheries, goes to its very heart: who may
legitimately employ force, in what manner, and for what purposes?
Professor Dinh's answers to these questions are simultaneously sober and
daring. The old "Westphalian"'" order of an international society based on
a community of states must be defended against the modem barbarians, the
terrorists. This is to be done, he contends, by the resuscitation-and indeed
elevation-of that most pilloried of attributes of the nation-state:
"patriotism" (or "nationalism"). 9 In one of those brilliant paradoxes that
only truly agile minds can follow, Dinh argues that the embrace of
patriotism, rather than being viewed as promoting the frequently decried
tendency towards unilateralism and parochialism, should be seen as
providing encouragement for cooperative multilateralism.
Thus, Professor Dinh's take on September 11 is less descriptive than
it is normative. His view is rooted in the apparent belief that the terrorism
of September 11 represents a fundamental development in international
relations, and the response to it must flow not only from the
government-whether in the militarized or criminalization formats-but
also through popular arousal and a call to arms. It is around these
normative underpinnings of Dinh's article that I shall weave this response.
I shall structure the response as follows: First, I shall take a closer look
at the ways in which September 11 is indeed an exceptional occurrence.
Second, I shall reflect on the nature of contemporary terrorism. Third, I
shall inquire into the extent to which terrorism is in fact a challenge to
both the idea and the practical existence of the nation-state. Finally, I shall
explain why nationalism and the nation-state, whatever their merits and
whatever values they may share (and I believe strongly in the continuing

15. Dinh, supra note 10, at 867.
16. Id. at 868.
17. Id.at 869.
18. Id. at 871.
19. See id. at 877 ("[W]e know all so well the atrocities committed in the name of
nationalism."). As early as 1775, Dr. Samuel Johnson famously defined patriotism as "the last
resort of a scoundrel," and, almost two centuries later, Ambrose Bierce would reply: "I beg to
submit that it is the first." AMBROSE BiERcE, THE CoLLEcTED WRITINGS OF AMBROSE BIERCE 323
(1946).
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vitality of the nation-state), should not be defended as bulwarks against
"international terrorism." Neither is.
II. THE EXCEPTIONALISM OF SEPTEMBER 11
It is easy enough to point to the exceptional facts of September 11. The
most powerful country in the world, with an annual gross domestic
production in excess of $9 trillion, 0 annual national defense expenditures
well in excess of $300 billion,21 well over a million persons under arms at
any given time,22 and over 700 military bases in more than thirty
countries, 21 was attacked successfully by a handful of technologically
underdeveloped foreign persons on its own contiguous territory for the
first time in almost 200 years. 24 The country not only sustained the loss of
over 3000 innocent lives, 25 but also was forced to close down its air space
and key commercial and financial institutions for days. 26 Above all, the
country experienced an unusual sense of vulnerability to persons and
events about whom and about which few second-thoughts hitherto had
been given.27 These facts, and the scale and complete surprise with which
they came, certainly provide explanations as to why an American
politician, citizen, or journalist might view the world differently after
September 11 than she previously did. They might even provide sufficient
grist for the domestic regulation of terrorism, such as that undertaken by

20. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 438 (2003)
(indicating a GDP of 9.825, 10.082, and 10.446 trillion dollars for years 2000, 2001, and 2002,
respectively), availableat http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-03.html.
21. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET FOR FIsCAL YEAR 2002-2-NATIONAL
DEFENSE, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/bud02.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2004).
22. CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE 102 (2004).

23. Id. at 154.
24. It is commonly noted that the last time any of the continental United States was attacked
by foreigners was close to two hundred years earlier. See, e.g., Brian Urquhart, A Matter of Truth,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 13, 2004, at 8 (book review). But see McAllister Hull, A Major Attack,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 2004, at 60 (letter) (challenging this common wisdom by pointing to
a "raid" by the Mexican civil war general, Pancho Villa, on a New Mexico settlement in 1916).
25. See THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-14.
26. FAA Orders New Safety Measures, CNN.COM, Travel, Sept. 13, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/TRAVEL/NEWS/09/12/faa.airports/index.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2004).
27. I do not mean to minimize the importance of these factors in shaping the reaction of the
United States-its politicians, citizens, and scholars alike--to the events of September 1 l. See, e.g.,
JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, SURPRISE, SECURrrY, AND THE AMERICAN EXPERINCE (2004) (including a

particularly eloquent explanation of the national reaction). What I do intend to distinguish is the
reaction of an American qua American, from that of a scholar (American or otherwise) writing as
a theorist of international law and/or international relations.
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the USA PATRIOT Act,28 and they may offer sufficient justification for
why a well-known elderly Congressman would be pulled aside at an
airport security line and subjected to an intrusive body search.29 For
journalists and politicians, these unusual facts may well be all that is
needed in order to push for wholesale restructuring of the existing social
order. They provide less justification for a legal scholar, particularly when
the order in question is international. A politician is entitled to operate
solely on the basis of expediency and emotion, and a journalist can afford
to be entirely descriptive. The politician's craft requires him or her to be
attentive to the visceral demands of the electorate, however whimsical or
seemingly illogical those demands might be. The "what, when, where, and
how" for the most part will suffice for the journalist, even when the "why"
goes begging.
For the legal scholar (at least one who advances prescriptive and
normative arguments for a preferred order), more might be expected. At
a minimum, the exceptionalism must be shown to be relevant to the ideas
and concepts that underpin the preferred order. She is obliged to relate
logically observed facts to anticipated behavior. Under this framework, the
relevant exceptionalism is not that the United States, a geopolitical entity,
was attacked; for, despite its preponderant power and influence (or,
however indispensable a nation it may be),30 it remains one, and only one,
member of a class of roughly 200 juridically equal sovereign states.3 '
While the damages sustained by the United States doubtless are high, there
is no reason to believe that they are so fundamentally different in kind
from those that have been experienced by it or by other societies in the
past, so as to make them the basis for a paradigm-creating shift in
normative thinking. 32 We are then left with the possibility that any such

28. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, (2001) (codified in scattered
titles and sections of the U.S.C.).
29. See, e.g., Margaret Carlson, The Case for a National ID Card: Big Brother Already
Knows Where You Live. Why Not Let Him Make You Safer?, TIME, Jan. 21,2002, at 52 (stating that
seventy-five-year-old Congressman John Dingell was required to pull down his pants after his
artificial hip set off a metal detector at an airport).
30. See, e.g., M. 0. Chibundu, Making Customary InternationalLaw Through Municipal
Adjudication: A StructuralInquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1069, 1119 n.177 (1999).
31. Professor Viet Dinh uses 191 or 193 as the number of sovereign states. See Dinh, supra
note 10, at 872. But this number appears to overlook contested situations such as those of "The
Western Sahara" and Taiwan, among others, and of course those continuing claims for selfdetermination by island groups in the South Pacific and the Caribbean. Nothing of consequence to
this discussion rides on the difference between his number and mine.
32. Cf Jay M. Vogelson, MultinationalApproachesto EradicatingInternationalTerrorism,
36 INT'L LAW. 67, 67 (2002) (cataloguing prior cases of terrorist attacks on or against the United
States). The contention here does not deny that an attack on the United States can, and has,
generated different treatment than would attacks on other societies. See Press Release, NATO,
Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12,2001), athttp://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-
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shift in intellectual thought is mandated by the identity and behavior of the
perpetrators of the September 11 atrocities. This is an argument
extensively developed by Dinh.33 At its core is a claim about the
uniqueness of terrorism, which makes terrorism a particularly potent
challenge to the international order. I shall address the specifics of the
claim in a moment, but it should be borne in mind that under this
argument, reliance on the events of September 11 is no more than
coincidental and symbolic, and the challenge to the international system
could have been triggered by terrorist events occurring outside of the
United States.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF TERROR

We do live in an age in which concerns over terrorism have become
dominant preoccupations of the elites and policy-makers of the West,34 as
well as those of a handful of wealthy non-Western societies-in short, of
those who decide (inasmuch as human beings can) the destiny of the
globe. What constitutes "terrorism" is far from uniformly agreed upon."

124e.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2004) [hereinafter NATO Press Release] (asserting that if it were
determined that the September 11 attack was directed against the United States from abroad, it
would be covered by Article V of the Washington Treaty, which states that "an armed attack
against one or more [members] shall be considered an attack against them all"); see also S.C. Res.
1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th sess., U.N. Doc, SC/7 158 (2001). But these responses should be seen for
what they are: political gestures, rather than the articulation of normative rules of behavior. This
Commentary, like that to which it responds, addresses a normative concern: whether the September
11 attack should be seen as so qualitatively differefit from these other attacks to merit a normative
shift in policy approaches to the issue of terrorism. See, e.g., Heifer, supra note 10, at 180
(discussing the September 11 terrorist attacks as compared to other "watershed events").
33. As Professor Dinh lyrically frames it, this is the "phenomenon of ideology unmoored
from geography, coupled with the means to inflict mass destruction." See Dinh supra note 10, at
869.
34. I use the term in the geopolitical sense in which it has been employed since the division
of Europe following the Yalta Conference. The end of the Cold War has seen, of course, an
eastward shift of the West as the European Union, for example, has come to embrace much that
used to be in the East. The term, however, continues to serve as a useful proxy for differentiating
between wealthy societies and the rest, as well as among world views.
35. See, e.g., Sami Zeidan, DesperatelySeeking Definition: The InternationalCommunity's
Questfor Identifying the Specter of Terrorism, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 491 (2004) (examining
various interpretations of terrorism and discussing the need for a clear definition that includes all
forms of terrorism); Heifer, supra note 10, at 182. But even within a single political entity, the
definitions of "terrorism" and "terrorist acts" may differ. Indeed, a single United States statute, 8
U.S.C. § 1189 (2000), incorporates two quite distinct definitions of what it means to engage in
terrorism. On the one hand, it refers to 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2000), which defines terrorism as
"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents." It also refers to 8 U.S.C § 11 82(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000),
which appears to define terrorism in terms of specific acts, including among others: the
"hijacking... of any conveyance"; "[tihe seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or
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Despite the existence of several international treaties and pronouncements
that seek to regulate "international terrorism," there is in fact no allencompassing definition ofthe term.36 Indeed, the international system has
opted for case-by-case regulation. 37 This is because it has proved to be

continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental
organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release
of the individual seized or detained"; "a violent attack" on the person or liberty of an internationally
protected person; "an assassination"; the use of any "biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear
weapon or device, or... explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for
mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or
more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property"; and, of course, conspiracy to do any
of the above. Thus, while the first directly defines terrorism in terms of the underlying political
motivation of the conduct in question, the second does so only circumspectly.
36. See, e.g., Vogelson, supra note 32, at 73-74. Of note is the work of the Sixth Committee
of the U.N. General Assembly, which has been attempting to unify the various definitions of
terrorism and to provide a blueprint for controlling it. See, e.g., Measures to EliminateInternational
Terrorism: Report of the Working Group, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 56th Sess., Agenda Item 166,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/56/L.9 (2001).
37. For example, because early forms of contemporary international terrorism involved the
hijacking of airplanes and/orthe seizure of hostages, especially diplomats, international agreements
addressed these means rather than those who employed them or the objectives for which they were
employed. See, e.g., Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, openedfor signature
Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 222; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, S.TREATY Doc. No. 100-19; International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, openedfor signatureDec. 18, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S.
205; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 137;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23,
1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention on Offenses and Certain
OtherActs Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963,20 U.S.T. 2941,704 U.N.T.S. 219. More
recently, concerns over international terrorism have focused on how it is financed and the possible
acquisition by the terrorists of so-called "weapons of mass destruction," namely biological,
chemical, and nuclear agents. The international regulatory framework has also thus shifted to the
specific regulation of these means. See, e.g., Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124; Convention on the Marking of
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, S.TREATY DOC. No. 103-8;
InternationalConventionfor the Suppression of the Financingof Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 160, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (2000); and
the InternationalConventionfor the Suppression of TerroristBombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N.
GAOR, 52d Sess., 72d mtg, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1997). Notably, the United States had not
ratified either of these last two Conventions as of September 11, 2001. The September 11 attack
did prompt dramatic responses from the United Nations Security Council, but even these fall short
of providing comprehensive responses to international terrorism. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1390, U.N.
SCOR, 57th sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (2002); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 32; S.C. Res. 1368,
U.N. SCOR, 56th sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); and S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 56th sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (1999). But see Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss5/2

8

Chibundu: For God, For Country, For Universalism: Sovereignty as Solidarity
DUNWODYC0A

_ENTARY

much easier to agree on specific actions that should be condemned than on
motivations. As the saying goes, one man's terrorist is another's freedom
fighter.3"
Whatever may be the semantic and rhetorical differences in the
definition of "international terror," Dinh's conception of the term as
embracing the systematic use of violence for "ideological"39 ends, by -an
organized non-state group4 falls well within conventional definitions,4
and it is this quite narrow definition that I have in mind for the purposes
ofthis response.42 A much more contestable proposition is Dinh' s apparent
4 3 Ishall, for
additional requirement that the violence be externally directed.
44
it.
to
return
will
I
but
element,
this
ignore
the moment,
Whatever disagreements existed as to what constitutes "terrorism," the
international system, at least prior to September 11, 2001, was united as
to how to deal with terrorism once it was identified. Common themes can
be found in the multiplicity of agreements on the subject. 45 At core, the
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 49th Sess., Annex, 84th plen. mtg., Agenda
Item 142, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (1994). But this last document, despite its broader sweep, is
neither law, nor does it purport to regulate international terrorism simpliciter. For an exhaustive
catalog of relevant international agreements, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of
InternationalTerrorism:A Policy-OrientedAssessment,43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83, 91-92 nn.25-40
(2002).
38. See, e.g., James Pfander, Charles Was First,LEGAL AFF., 20, 20 May-June 2004.
39. Others might prefer "political," "religious," "philosophical," and similar terms. I use the
term "ideology" to embrace any and all of these "forms" or "manifestations" of what might pull
a group to employ systematic violence in the service of a stated objective.
40. Terrorist acts can be and frequently are perpetrated by individuals, but for the purposes
of this Commentary, such acts must be pursuant to or implied from instructions issued on behalf
of a group.
41. Two clarifications of this definition are worth noting. First, to speak of the systematic use
of violence is not to deny the randomness of its victims. It is simply to state that the choice of
means is not arbitrary, but is rather the product of considered decisions. Secondly, this definition
applies even in the context of so-called state-sponsored terrorism. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman,
InternationalLegal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J.INT'L L. 3, 55-56 (1999). Whatever else
these instances of the use of force may entail, the agents of terrorism here do not act explicitly in
the name of the state. Indeed, "plausible deniability" by the state is the hallmark of the use of
violence in these situations. The definition therefore also rejects the highly subjective approach of
terming any use of violence by the state that one finds objectionable "state terrorism." Cf
Bassiouni, supra note 37, at 84-85 ("State terrorism ...is carried out by state actors and is usually
characterized by extensive, widespread, or systematic use of violence in violation of international
humanitarian law and human rights law. It includes genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and torture." (footnote omitted)). If this view is 'correct, then the explicit rejection in the Rome
Treaty of a crime as "terrorism" is pointless.
42. Aside from its straightforwardness, this definition, to my mind, has the added advantage
of limiting the subjectivity inherent in definitions that inquire into the specific motive for the
particular conduct in question.
43. See Dinh, supra note 10, at 874.
44. See infra notes 150-68 and accompanying text.
45. See Conventions and Agreements cited supra note 37.
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focus on terrorism was about the lawfulness of the means employed by
terrorists to achieve their ends. With each state as the primary enforcer of
its own laws, the standard approach was that as each means was identified,
the state was required to render the means unlawful within its domestic
laws and to use the instruments of municipal law enforcement to render the
consequent criminalization of terrorism effective.46 States were urged to
cooperate with each other through such measures as exchange of
-information,47 the prosecution or extradition of terrorists,4" and the
rendering of mutual assistance.49 In other words, the international system
approached control of terrorism in much the same way as it treats the vast
majority of issues of transnational legal concern. Reliance was vested
primarily in self-interested (and often self-induced) cooperation among
states, both bilaterally and multilaterally, and on limited coordination,
rather than in a rigidly centralized, undifferentiated, and supranationally
harmonized set of substantive rules.
The events of September 11 (or, more accurately, the United States'
response to those events) dramatically and radically altered the landscape.
As I have already indicated, barely had the President of the United States
become aware of the crash ofjetliners into buildings in the United States
when he announced that these events constituted the declaration of war on
the United States and that the perpetrators would be dealt with
accordingly."0 That this was not simply the overblown rhetoric of a
politician was made abundantly clear over the ensuing days and weeks.
Aside from the understandable exigent measures of completely closing
down United States air space with orders to shoot down without questions
any infringing civil aircraft"' and the instituting of dragnets, other steps,
coupled with several pronouncements by the President, made plain that the
United States' response would not merely be somewhat militaristic, but
almost exclusively so. This would be a "crusade," President Bush
informed the world,52 in which any country that was not with the United
States was automatically with the terrorists.53 Osama bin Laden, the al

46. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 32 (directing member states to criminalize the use
of funds for terrorism and to assist each other in criminal investigations regarding such crimes). See
generally Heifer, supra note 10, at 183.
47. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 32, at
2(b), 3(b).
48. See, e.g., id. at 2(e).
49. See generally Bassiouni, supra note 37, at 94-95.
50. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
51. THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 31, 42-43.
52. President George W. Bush, Remarks upon Arrival at the White House South Lawn (Sept.
16, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109162.html) ("This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while.").
53. The President declared:
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Qaeda leader who reportedly masterminded the attacks on the United
States, was to be hunted down with a multi-million dollar bounty on his
head, regardless of whether he was killed or captured.54 Bin Laden's hosts,
the Taliban leaders of Afghanistan, were given a non-negotiable
ultimatum: surrender him to the United States or face annihilation." The
country rallied around the call to take up arms. In virtually no time,
Congress, with a sole dissenting vote, gave the President completely
unrestricted power in the use of military force as a response to September
I L And in time, a war was fought in Afghanistan resulting in the
overthrow ofthe Taliban Government and the reconstitution of the Afghan
state.57
Just as important as the resort to military force in dealing with
international terror was the readiness with which the United States

[W]e will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation,
in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are
with the terrorists.... From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor
or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.
President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People at the
Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 20, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html) [hereinafter Bush, Address
to a Joint Session]; see also President George W. Bush, Remarks at a Reception for Senatorial
Candidate John Comyn in Houston, Texas (Sept. 26, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/print/20020926-17.html [hereinafter Bush,
Remarks at a Reception] ("It's important for you to know the doctrine I laid out still stands: you're
either with us, or you're with the enemy. That's clear.").
54. See Deborah Orin, Experts: Bounty $ Worked Before, N.Y. POST, Sept. 23, 2001, at 6.
55. Bush, Address to a Joint Session, supra note 53 ("[Tlhe United States of Americamakes
the following demand[] on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al
Qaeda who hide in your land. . . . Th[is] demand[] [is] not open to negotiation or
discussion.... They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate."). The accepted
international law doctrine is that a state harboring a fugitive accused of crime may elect either to
surrender (i.e., "extradite") the fugitive, or to put the fugitive on trial. See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly,
Cheating Justice by Cheating Death: The Doctrinal Collision for Prosecuting Foreign
Terrorists-PassageofAut Dedere Aut Judicare into CustomaryLaw & Refusal to ExtraditeBased
on the Death Penalty, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMe. L. 491,496-500 (2003). See generallyM. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AuT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR
PROSECUTE ININTERNATIONALLAW (1995) (examining the variety of international instruments that
impose a duty to prosecute or to extradite).
56. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified
at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (West 2004)). So broad was this authority that the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted it as permitting the United States President to declare a United States citizen
found in Afghanistan an "enemy combatant," who can be held in detention indefinitely (or at least
for the duration of the war), subject only to minimal procedural safeguards. See Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2635-36 (2004).
57. See Ivo H. Daalder & James M. Lindasy, The US. ObligationinAfghanistan, SANDIEGO
UNON-TRiB., Nov. 26, 2001, at B-7.
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abandoned "law" as a tool in that fight. The President repeatedly spoke of
American justice in terms of the extrajudicial killings of alleged
terrorists.58 He measured success in the "war against terrorism" less by
enumerating how many attempts had been foiled, or how many
perpetrators effectively were prosecuted and imprisoned, but more by
counting up how many were "no longer around" to trouble us.59 At home,
such; laws as those adopted to assure the availability for fact-gathering of
"material witnesses" and to regulate "immigration" were diverted from
their intended purposes and used extensively to detain persons indefinitely
under atrocious conditions. 60
Abroad, the seeming irrelevance of law was made even starker. Aside
from being read as permitting presidentially sanctioned extrajudicial
killings,6 the "war on terrorism" was employed to justify the sweeping-up
and the indefinite and clandestine detention of anyone anywhere in the
world, without accountability to anyone but the Executive Branch of the
United States government.62 Within the Executive Branch, the
accountability was not to flow from compliance with legal rules. The
President's legal advisers assured him that as "commander-in-chief," he
was subject neither to the domestic laws of the country forbidding the use
of torture, 63 nor to the international law rules that, at least over the last

58. See, e.g., Bush: Osama, Saddam Will Be Caught, CBS/AP NEWS, June 24, 2003, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/24/attack/main560134.shtml (last visited Sept. 30,2004);
see also David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Threats and Responses: Hunt for Suspects: Fatal
Strike in Yemen Was Based on Rules Set Out by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at 16; James
Risen & David Johnston, Bush Has Widened Authority ofC.I.A. to Kill Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2002, § 1, at 1.
59. See, e.g., Bush, Remarks at a Reception, supra note 53.
60. See, e.g., Donna R. Newman, The Jose Padilla Story, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 39, 40
(2004); see also OFFICEOFTHE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, REPORTTO CONGRESS ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1001 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 6 (2003), available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0307/final.pdf; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER II DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON
IMMIGRATION CHARGES INCONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATrACKS
I n.2 (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/chapterl.htm#7; OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER II DETAINEES'
ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

1 (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/detaineesl203.pdf. For a discussion
and evaluation of the post-September 11 treatment of persons caught up in the United States
Immigration Law dragnet, see Lee Hall, Nomads Under the Tent ofBlue: Migrants Fuel the US.
Prison Industry, RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
61. See Rights Group Questions Attack: Amnesty Says US. Missile Strike in Yemen May Be
Illegal, WASH. POST, Nov. 9,2002, at A21; Howard Witt, US.: Killing ofAl Qaeda Suspects Was
Lawful, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 24, 2002, at C 1.
62. See Oral Arguments at 23-25, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004) (No. 03-334),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts/03-334.pdf.
63. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Pentagon Report Set Framework for Use ofTorture, WALL ST. J.,
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century, have regulated the waging of war, and to which the United States
hitherto had been a consistent adherent.' In the waging of the "war on
' The logical
terrorism," these laws were deemed "obsolete" and "quaint."65
extension of this mindset ultimately was the adoption of a doctrine- of
"preventive war,"" in contravention of accepted international law rules 6
and the extension of that doctrine to the occupation of Iraq.68
The United States is, of course, a constitutionaldemocratic republic.
The shunting aside of legal constraints would not have. been
contemplated-let alone undertaken-by the President without the
assurance of support (or, at a minimum, tacit acquiescence) from the
people and their representatives. In the immediate aftermath of September
11, the general population applauded the war-like measures taken by the
President. His popularity, as measured in one poll, rose from 55%.just
before the terrorist attack, to 86% four days later and to 92% shortly
thereafter. 69 The secret lock-ups of anonymous persons both at
Guantanamo Bay, and of so-called "high value targets" at unknown (and
still undisclosed) places,7 and the reported "rendition" of persons to
countries where they could be tortured (if not the outright use of torture by
United States intelligence and law enforcement personnel71 ) elicited
indifference in the public and among its legislative representatives. And

June 7, 2004, at Al; David Johnston & James Risen, Aides Say Memo Backed Coercion Already
in Use, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2004, § 1, at 1.
64. See Draft Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to President
George W. Bush 3 (Jan. 25, 2002) (discussing the application of the Geneva Convention on
Prisoners of War to the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban), available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4999148/sitelnewsweek.
65. Id. at 2.
66. See NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13-17 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
nss.pdf.
67. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, American Exceptionalism and the International Law of
Self-Defense, 31 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 43, 53-54 (2002); Miriam Sapiro, Agora: Future
Implication of the Iraq Conflict: Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J.
INT'LL. 599,599 (2003). Butsee William H. Taf, IV, The Law ofArmed Conflict Afler 9/11: Some
Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 319-20 (2003).
68. See generally BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK (2004) (discussing how and why
President George W. Bush, his war council, and his allies launched a preemptive war in Iraq).
69. See, e.g., Polling Percentages HighforAmericans'Support ofPresident Bush and Their
Confidence That US Will Be Safe, ABC NEWS: WORLD NEWS Now, Oct. 11, 2001, 2001 WL
22700074. Other polls concurred with the trend. See, e.g., Deborah L. Acomb, Poll Track for
September 29, 2001, NAT'L J., Sept. 29, 2001, 2001 WL 25926169.
70. See, e.g., Dana Priest & Joe Stephens, Secret World of US. Interrogation: Long History
of Tactics in Overseas Prisons Is Coming to Light, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at AO1.
71. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, US. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: 'Stress
and Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST,
Dec. 26, 2002, at A01.
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so, a Senate which rose up with virtual unanimity to denounce an internetbased game that modeled the probabilities of a future terrorist attack72
could not, at least prior to April 2004, muster enough support to
investigate, let alone condemn, the obvious lawlessness with which the
Executive Branch was waging the "war on terrorism."73 Nor did the courts
prove themselves to be stalwart defenders of individual rights or civil
liberties. With very few exceptions, the judiciary invoked the passive
virtues-notably stare decisis and judicial deference (especially that due
the "commander-in-chief')--to forestall any inquiry into the merits of
these blatant denials of legal protections.74
It is thus beyond cavil that in the post-September 11 era, the approach
of the United States both as a country and as a society has been to view the
struggle against terrorism in militaristic rather than legal terms. This
approach cannot help but be significant in the international system's
conceptualization of the issue. The United States is not a primus inter
pares within the international system solely by virtue ofthe overwhelming
military, economic, and political might (so-called "hard power") 75 that it
wields. Beyond these, its status as the principal purveyor of cultural and
intellectual fads may well be even more important in assuring its
hegemonic grip over the system. Its approach thus influences and modifies
international law both by commanding adherents and by inducing
acquiescence, if not outright acceptance. In the immediate aftermath of
September 11, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies
unanimously concurred in the view that the appropriate response to
September 11 was war. For the first time since the founding of the
organization, NATO invoked the singular article ofjoint military defense,
which stated that an attack on one member is an attack on all.76 The

72. See David Ballingrud, Wanna Bet?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Florida), Sept. 14, 2003, at
I D; Carl Hulse, Threats andResponses: Plans and Criticisms: Swiftly, Planfor Terrorism Futures
Market Slips into Dustbin ofIdea Without a Future, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2003, at AI0.
73. See supra note 56 for a discussion of the significance of this later development.
74. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140-45 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding,
on the basis of Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), that foreigners detained on territory
controlled by the United States could not seek habeas corpus relief in the United States because
territory was not "sovereign territory" of the United States), rev 'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.
Ct. 2686 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 471-72, 476 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that
presidential war-making powers include an essentially unreviewable authority to classify a person
detained in a war theater as an "enemy combatant"), vacated, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004); N.J. Media
Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219-21 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that newspapers can
completely be denied access to a deportation hearing where the Attorney-General determines that
access to such a hearing presents "national security concerns").
75. See JOSEPH S.NYE, JR., SOFT POwER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS 14
(2004).
76. See NATO Press Release, supra note 32.
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Organization of American States took much the same position."'
Moreover, the international system, as a whole, appears to have acquiesced
in this militarization of the response to international terror when. it
remained entirely silent even in the face of a seeming violation of a
longstanding customary international legal norm: that ships flying the flags
of non-belligerents cannot be boarded on the high seas. Thus, when a
Spanish warship, acting at the request of the United States, boarded a
Cambodian-registered ship, reportedly because the ship was suspected of
ferrying terrorist-related contraband from North Korea, only Yemen
protested.7"
The international system similarly abetted the undermining of legal
rules in the fight against world-wide terror. Several countries radically
revised (or reinterpreted) their laws and practices to denude procedural
protections for those, especially non-citizens, who might be suspected
of being (or otherwise being in a position to assist) terrorists.79

77. See ORG. OF AM. STATES, TERRORIST ATTACKS ON UNITED STATES ARE AN ATTACK ON
ALL COUNTRIES OF THE AMERICAS, FOREIGN MINISTERS DECLARE (Sept. 21, 2001), at
http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press2002/en/press2pO I/sept0l/94.htm (last visited Oct. 15,2004).
78. See Bradley Graham, Gaps in Plan to HaltArms Trade: Legal Authorityfor Intensified
InterdictionIs Questioned, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2003, at A23. For statements of the applicable
international law doctrines, see, for example, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
openedforsignature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; The S.S.Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 9, at 25 (Sept. 7).
79. The United Kingdom, under its "Antiterrorism Act," permits the indefinite detention of
foreigners without judicial intervention. See, e.g., ScrapAnti-Terror DetentionLaw, (BBC News,
Dec. 18,2003), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/ukpolitics/3330221.stm (last visited Oct.
15, 2004). Moreover, this power has been used extensively by the United Kingdom's "Special
Branch." See, e.g., John Upton, In the Streets ofLondonistan,LONDONREV. BOOKS, Jan. 22,2004,
at 3 (reporting that under Britain's anti-terror legislation, 529 persons have been arrested, only
eighty-one ofwhom were charged with violations of law, and sixteen foreigners have been detained
under its indefinite detention provision). The British government, which has been highly critical
of the use of Guantanamo Bay, distinguishes its practice on the ground that foreigners detained
under the United Kingdom's antiterror laws can always end their detention by voluntarily leaving
the United Kingdom, although in practice, no mechanism exists for exercising this theoretical right.
See, e.g., Lucy Scott-Moncrieff, Suspicion of Terrorism, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Aug. 5, 2004, at
22; see also John Carreyrou, Fighting Words: France Moves Fast to Expel Muslims Preaching
Hatred,WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2004, at Al. Carreyrou writes:
If Mr. Guler had been French, he would have had the chance to defend himself
at a trial. But as a foreigner, he fell under a 1945 law that allowed the government
to deport him as an urgent security threat.
France has taken one of the hardest lines of any Western country in fighting
Islamic extremism. Other democracies, including the U.S., have been criticized
for excessive methods, . . . [bjut few have been as systematic and zealous as
France in attempting to stamp out Islamic militancy.
Id.; see also Craig S. Smith, France Is Struggling to Suppress Extremist Muslim Clerics, N.Y.
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Additionally, in the wake of September 11, virtually all countries
readily agreed that an effective tool in combating terrorism lies in
denying funding to it. There was thus the need for adopting and
enforcing strict regulations on financial transfers, especially those that
flow across borders." The ensuing practice was to take a nondiscriminatory approach toward the regulation of non-traditional
Western financial institutions. In particular, informal institutions
employed by Muslims, such as the al Barakaat Bank, were closed down
en masse, depriving those who ran them of the most minimal protections
against wrongful deprivation ofproperty." Overnight, hitherto legitimate
institutions of finance were rendered suspect and subject to arbitrary
closure solely on the ground that they could not easily be supervised by
governments in the West.82 And, as already pointed out, many countries
within the international system appear to have been willing to accept
renditions of persons suspected
by the United States of being terrorists
83
and to torture such persons.
This, then, is the post-September 1 world within which Dinh's norm
of "patriotism" as a response to international terrorism will have to
function. It is an age marked by pervasive national and personal
insecurities that have been generated by the overriding fear of terrorism;
an era in which the standard response by governments and the population
at large has been to see law, at worst, as irrelevant and, at best, as a backup to the military response. The obvious question with which we are thus
TIMEs, Apr. 30, 2004, at A3 (discussing France's use of its immigration and antiterrorism laws to
control religious speech by Muslim imams); Pankaj Mishra, India: The Neglected Majority Wins!,
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 12, 2004, at 30 (pointing out that the outgoing BJP party enacted an
Indian analog, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, to the USA PATRIOT Act.).
80. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 32, In I(d), 2(d).
81. See, e.g., Paul Beckett, Money-TransferFirm's Closure Cuts Somali Lifeline, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 4, 2001, at A4; Paul Beckett, Informal Money-Movement System in UAE Is Likely
Uncontrollable, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A6; Leaders of the Somali Factions Call on
Washington to Release Al-Barakat Bank Assets, ARABIC NEWS, Nov. 12, 2002, at
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/021112/2002111215.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2004); see also Aaran Money Wire Serv., Inc. v. United States, No. 02CV789JMR/FLN, 2003 WL
22143735, at * 13 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2003) (applying the mootness doctrine to avoid ruling on the
merits of a challenge to the Executive Order and enforcement actions that resulted in the raid on
and judicially unsanctioned seizure of the assets of the plaintiffs).
82. The Hawala financial exchange system is a quintessential example of this culturally
myopic approach of the international system to the war on terrorism. See, e.g., MOHAMMED EL
QORCHI ET AL., INFORMAL FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS:

AN ANALYSIS

OF THE INFORMAL HAWALA

SYSTEM 13 (2003).
83. Of course much ofthis practice was undertaken surreptitiously. Yet, there is evidence that
it did go on. See, e.g., Dana Priest & Joe Stephens, Secret World of US. Interrogation:Long
History of Tactics in Overseas PrisonsIs Coming to Light, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at AO1;
Thomas Walkom, New Torture Claim Shows Arar's Case Isn't Unique, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 26,
2004, at AOl.
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confronted is how a reinvigorated patriotism, as suggested by Dinh, fits
into this milieu. To give a meaningful answer, it is helpful, if not
essential, to explore-however cursorily-the contemporary concept of
patriotism.
IV. NATIONALISM IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

"Nationalism" (or, as Dinh prefers, "patriotism"), s" as Liah Greenfeld,
among others, has ably and exhaustively demonstrated, is a protean term
that has eluded being fixed in time or place. 5 At core, it is certainly about
creating or maintaining an identity by invoking or shrouding oneself in a
shared loyalty among a likeminded group.g Nationalism is thus built on
the solidarity of the group whose interests are seen as distinct from those
outside of it. Thus, the nature ofthe shared common interest and the means
by which they are furthered vis-A-vis the outsider are highly relevant in
84. See Dinh, supra note 10, at 869 (stating that "nationalism" is a blunt synonym for
"patriotism"); cf Minxin Pei, The ParadoxesofAmerican Nationalism,FOREIGN POL'Y, May-June
2003, at 30-31:
Nationalism is a dirty word in the .United States, viewed with disdain and
associated with Old World parochialism and imagined supremacy. Yet those who
discount the idea of American nationalism may readily admit that Americans, as
a whole, are extremely patriotic. When pushed to explain the difference between
patriotism and nationalism, those same skeptics might concede, reluctantly, that
there is a distinction, but no real difference. . . . In reality, however, the
psychological and behavioral manifestations of nationalism and patriotism are
indistinguishable, as is the impact of such sentiments on policy.
My own preference (at least in the context of social science scholarship) is for the "blunter"
term, "nationalism," but in deference to Prof. Dinh, I shall strive to employ the term "patriotism"
when discussing his views. These two terms, in turn, should be distinguished from others with
which they are sometimes pejoratively associated: "jingoism," "chauvinism," and "xenophobia."
These latter terms find the supremacy of national identity as essential to their articulation, but the
former, while expressive of national pride, do not necessarily connote a supremacist ideology.
85. See LIAH GREENFELD, NATIONALISM: FIVE ROADS TO MODERNITY 3-4 (1992); see also
E. J.HOBSBAWM, NATIONS ANDNATIONAIiSM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALrrY 5-6 (2d
ed. 1992).
86. See GREENFELD, supra note 85, at 3-4; see also BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED
COMMUNITIES: REFLECIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 4 (Rev. ed. 1991).
Anderson explains it thus:
[N]ationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word's multiple
significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts [sic] of a
particular kind. To understand them properly we need to consider carefully how
they have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed
over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy.
ANDERSON, supra, at 4.
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determining how benignly one ought to view a particular claim of
patriotism. 7
.Contemporary claims of nationalism associate it indelibly with fidelity
to the nation-state. The idea of a state-the Montevideo Convention,
notwithstanding 8 -is by no means a fixed or rigid one. 9 Thus, one of the
hallmarks of contemporary nationalism has been that when dissatisfied
with an existing state, nationalists have sought, through secession or "selfdetermination," to carve out a new state to which they might extend their
unalloyed loyalty. This has been a predominant feature of the post-World
War II order 9° and one which became particularly dominant in the 1990s.
Dinh' s approved conception ofpatriotism, he readily admits, is one that
harkens back to the early part of the nineteenth century and finds its
mooring in the clarion call of Stephen Decatur's frequently quoted toast:
"Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be
in the right; but our country, right or wrong."'" Juxtaposed against this
"unyielding love that dares not speak its name" is an alternative vision of
'
patriotism; one that has come to be referred to as "cosmopolitanism."92
87. Cf John Schaar, What Is Patriotism?,NATION, July 15, 1991, at http://www.thenation.
com/doc.mhtml?i=19910715&s=forum (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). Schaar distinguishes between
two forms of patriotism: Those who see "[tihe new god.... [as] lapatrie,the nation, and the new
commander [as] the state," and patriotism that is "rooted in the love of one's own land and people,
love too of the best ideals of one's own culture and tradition." Id. The former "is the worship of
national power, of national greatness, nearly always expressed as power over other peoples and
qualities, and as power that acknowledges no limits on its own assertion." Id. The latter "finds no
glory in puffing their country up by pulling others' down," but rather "is profoundly municipal,
even domestic. Its pleasures are quiet, its services steady and unpretentious." Id.; see also infra note
97 and accompanying text (discussing American patriotism in the post-September 11 political
environment).
88. See Dinh, supra note 10, at 872. The Latin American countries, of course, were speaking
only for themselves, and their position does not conclusively dispose of one of the most debated
issues regarding the nature of the state: whether it exists on the basis of objective facts and the
assertion of its citizens (the so-called "declaratory" view) or whether a state only comes into being
when it has been extended recognition by other members ofthe international society (the so-called
"constitutive" view).
89. See, e.g., DAVID G. RUNCIMAN, PLURALISM AND THE PERSONALITY OF THE STATE 3
(1997).
90. See generally Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Book Review, 11 L. & POL. BK. REV. 145 (2001)
(reviewing GNAPALA WELHENGAMA, MINORITIES' CLAIMS: FROM AUTONOMY TO SECESSION,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE PRACTICE (2000)).
91. See Dinh, supra note 10, at 877 (citing Commodore Stephen Decatur, Toast at a Dinner
in Norfolk, Virginia (Apr. 1816), in ALEXANDER SLIDELL MACKENZIE, LIFE OF STEPHEN DECATUR
295, 295 (1848)).
92. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotismand Cosmopolitanism, in MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY? 3, 4 (Joshua Cohen ed., 2002). Although Professor Nussbaum frames the
issue in terms of the community to which we should owe our primary moral duties, both as a
practical and as an ontological matter, this is not a fundamentally different question from the
identification of a community to which our primary political loyalties are owed.
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Under this outlook, "our highest allegiance must be to the community of
humankind, and the first principles of our practical thought must respect
the equal worth of all members of that community."93 Cosmopolitanism
thus places loyalty to the nation-state behind loyalty to humankind.94 Dinh
finds this conception of loyalty to be in conflict with his conception of
patriotism--or, perhaps more accurately, in conflict with his proposal. of
a reinvigorated patriotism.95 He correctly contends that proponents of
cosmopolitanism "underestimate the value of the nation-state as the basic
political unit of international order," 96 but he wrongly posits that "loving
one's country allows one to love others more." 97 It is in this conflation of
the importance of the nation-state to the maintenance of international order
with the insistence of primary devotion to it that Dinh's enterprise falters.
To explain why patriotism is not (and would not be) merely an
inadequate-but rather, a thoroughly dangerous-response to international
terrorism, it may be helpful at the outset to make explicit a dichotomy in

93. See Joshua Cohen, Editor'sPreface to NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at vii-viii.
94. It is worth emphasizing that in this Commentary, I use the terms "patriotism" and
"cosmopolitanism" in the very narrowly confined senses that I understand Professor Dinh to mean
when he deploys them in his Dunwody Lecture; that is as more or less polar opposites. Thus, the
interpretation of cosmopolitanism that I employ here, as a conceptual matter, would exclude
Professor Appiah's claim (with which I happen personally to agree) that "[w]e cosmopolitans can
be patriots, loving our homelands (not only the states where we were born but the states where we
grew up and where we"live)." Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, in NUSSBAUM,
supra note 92, at 21, 26.
95. See Dinh, supra note 10, at 877-78. Professor Dinh is by no means alone in believing that
Americans, notwithstanding public displays of allegiance to the country (e.g., the pervasive
pledging of allegiance, chants at sporting activities, and national flag wavings) have been
insufficiently patriotic. See, e.g., ANDREW J.BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALFS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY 80 (2002) ("To the extent that some vestige of patriotism
survived into the post-Cold War era, it did so as nostalgia, sentimentality, martial exhibitionism,
and a readily exploitable source of entertainment.").
96. See Dinh, supra note 10, at 877.
97. Id. at 878. Professor Dinh asserts that:
[L] oving our country-loving this country-allows us (indeed requires us) to love
others more. As President George W. Bush expounded: "Unlike any other country,
America came into the world with a message for mankind, that all are created
equal, and all are meant to be free. There is no American race. There's only an
American creed: We believe in the dignity and rights of every person ......
Id. (footnote omitted). It may be that American patriotism is unique in its virtuousness--surely at
least a debatable proposition-but for the purposes of my Commentary, I shall not assume so
intensely particularistic a form of American exceptionalism. My views are intended to be of more
general application, and I shall treat the concept of patriotism as one that is capable of being
molded by a prototypical society at a stated time and in a given place. Thus, in the absence of the
complete Americanization of the world, American patriotism, however benign, if it is to be the
basis for a norm in international relations, must be capable of replication by other societies.
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analytical methods. At one level, all analysis depends on description or
interpretation of reality. At another level, we seek to make reality conform
to our preferences or norms. The two approaches clearly are not unrelated.
Our,. perception of the reality that we seek to describe is shaped
significantly by our norms and principles, and the latter, far from being
fixed and permanent, respond to our understanding of reality. But the
relationship of the two planes of thought to each other is not ineluctable.
Evaluating the extent to which patriotism or cosmopolitanism (or some
third ideology) offers the better response to the challenge of international
terrorism requires conscious awareness of these distinctions and
relationships.
As a historical fact, Dinh has company in placing patriotism and
terrorism within a single milieu. As is widely accepted, the modem
antecedents of both-their systematization into the forms with which we
are now familiar-are to be found in the immediate aftermath of the
French Revolution. The extensive use of violence in the service ofpolitical
ideals-notably in the interest of the "rights of man and the citizen" and
of "liberty, equality and frateity"--we all recall as being integral to the
revolution.98 Perhaps less well-known is that modem patriotism is also an
offspring of the same revolution, and it is so in two seemingly
contradictory ways. First, as John Schaar points out,
Abb6 Sieyrs named the new god: "The nation exists
before all. It is the origin of everything. It is the law itself."
By 1792, in a petition addressed to the National Assembly,
the ferociously jealous claims of the new god were made
chillingly clear: "The image of the patrie is the sole divinity
which it is permitted to worship. "
In short, having dethroned subjugation to King and Religion,
revolutionary France replaced it with unquestioning loyalty to "nation"
and to "reason." But in the wake of the 18th Brumaire, Citizen France
became imperial France, and what was good for it was seen by Frenchmen
as automatically and unquestionably good for all of mankind. But neither
the Spaniards, nor the Portuguese, nor the Germans, let alone the English

98. See, e.g., Geoffrey Nunberg, The -ism Schism: How Much Wallop Can a Simple Word
Pack?,N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, § 4, at 7 ("The modem senses of 'terror' and 'terrorism' reach
back to a single historical moment: 'la Terreur,' Robespierre's Reign of Terror in 1793 and 1794.").
Charles Dickens's A Tale of Two Cities permits us to swallow this bitter pill with some pleasure.
But see Pfander, supra note 38, at 20 (arguing that the origins of modem political terrorism are
better laid at the feet of King Charles I of England).
99. Schaar, supra note 87. Indeed, Robespierre is reported to have said of terror that it "'is
nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue.'
Nunberg, supra note 98, § 4, at 7.
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or the Russians, agreed. French enlightenment in the abstract might be
good for humanity, but when imposed under the jackboots of Napoleon's
armies, it was to be resisted. And so, secondly, "patriotism" ("my country,
right or wrong") proved to be as useful a gathering cry for the noimetropolitan subjects of imperial France as it had been for the nascent
revolutionaries yearning to be free of Louis XVI.
Early encounters with modem patriotism thus teach at least three
lessons. First, it was born out of idealism. Second, idealism could not
contain it; rather, patriotism swallowed up the parent, and promoted its
narrow conception of national interest by a vacuous appeal to that ideal.
Third, the rest of humanity was not fooled. In reaction, they adopted their
own nationalisms. But, as subsequent history also teaches, this defensive
patriotism proved no more susceptible of being confined to benign and
limited objectives than was French revolutionary nationalism.0 The
history of Europe between 1870 and 1945 is primarily the history of
defensive nationalism; that is, of "patriotism" as a response to external
aggression.'0 ' Love of country and of kinsfolk required France to go to war
to recapture Alsace-Loraine, which Germany had seized following her
victory in the war of 1870, and it was love of the "fatherland" that
buttressed Germany's wars of the 1930s to remove the stain of Versailles.
And, of course, it should not be forgotten that the "first great war"
commenced with the terrorist assassination of an archduke, which in turn
precipitated "patriotic" responses even among those socialists who had
hitherto subscribed to the "withering away of the state."
To all of these, Dinh's response doubtless will be that "American
patriotism is different." And he may be right. 2 But if so, it will not be
because American patriotism recalls the classical formulation as stated in
Stephen Decatur's toast.
But disagreeing with belief in the corrective value of patriotism does
not entail accepting the cosmopolitan outlook. 0 3 If historical experiences
demonstrate the dangers of idealizing patriotism, the flaws of the
cosmopolitan outlook flow from its lack of grounding in reality.
Cosmopolitanism has been presented as a foil to patriotism because it is
seen as transcending loyalty to the nation-state. As an aspiration, it may be
100. See, e.g., HOBSBAWM, supra note 85, at 19-20.
101. This mindset is powerfully captured by a contemporary of that period. See generally
VICENT E BLASCO IBAREZ, THE FouR HORSEMEN OF THE APOCALYPSE (Charlotte Brewster Jordan
trans., 1919) (depicting patriotism in Europe during World War I).
102. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the private character of American
patriotism).
103. It may be worth reminding the reader that the "cosmopolitan outlook" (which I shall use
interchangeably with "cosmopolitanism") posits as the proper form of identification the loyalty of
persons to or identification with humanity, which is unmediated through the state. See supra notes
92-94 and accompanying text.
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lauded and accorded sympathetic scrutiny; as a statement or description of
the facts on the ground, it is both incorrect and unrealistic.
As Dinh correctly points out, the international system, for at least the
last three-and-a-half centuries, has been organized around the idea of the
nation-state as the primary actor within the international system.'14 At
core, the system regulates behavior by assigning primary responsibility to
the state and then seeking to coordinate state behavior. This has given the
nation-state the preeminent role within the system-a role that the concept
of sovereignty merely confirms. The ascendancy of the state to this role
was not accidental, nor has its perpetuation been a mere matter of chance.
The European state system emerged from centuries of conflict and
compromise within religious institutions and among religious leaders,
between religious and secular leaders, and among secular feudal barons
and emerging commercial and technocratic bourgeoisie. In these
multifaceted struggles, the state emerged as the institution best able to
provide personal security and effectively distribute resources among the
competing social groups.'0 5 It proved remarkably adept in harnessing and
using violence both within and without the national society and, just as
importantly, in employing law, legal technocrats, and civil administrators
as ameliorative forces to the use of violence. The state thus guaranteed
safety and predictability in the here and now, and membership in it
remained open and flexible.
Reflexive loyalty to the state and uncritical pride in it were simply the
reciprocal responses that followed from the state's discharge of these
functions. In the early stages of statehood, that loyalty in large part
reflected the effectiveness of the state in discharging the obligations that
it had undertaken. Thus, patriotism, as an instinctive manifestation of
loyalty, did not become an integral aspect of statehood for about a centuryand-a-half after the contours of the modern European nation-state were
more or less delineated.0 6 The European state system was, of course,
exported to the rest of the world along with European commercial
intercourse and imperial and colonial rule. In these other lands, its capacity
to effectively mold military force and administrative institutions into an
efficient organism again proved its efficacy, so much so that even when de
jure imperialism and colonialism were abandoned, the inheritors of power
in the new societies unanimously embraced the state structure and became

104. See Dinh, supra note 10, at 871.
105. Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, published three years after the Treaty of Westphalia,
remains the most powerful philosophical account of the rise of the European state. THoMAS
HOBBES,

LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER

OF A COMMONWEALTH,

EccLEsAsTIALL AND CiviL I1(Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962) (1651).
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining the origins of patriotism in the
French Revolution).
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some of its strongest proponents. 10 7 Indeed, the principle of selfdetermination, surely one of the strongest international law norms of the
twentieth century, essentially became synonymous with the right of a
group to form its own state. It is against this backdrop that the viability of
the cosmopolitan ideal must be gauged.
To be sure, on the face of it, cosmopolitanism appears to be against the
state. But this is a superficial reading. There is, in fact, nothing in
cosmopolitanism that dismisses pride in or loyalty to the state. 08 What
cosmopolitanism asks is for loyalty to the species to be seen as more
important than loyalty to the state. There is a specific program behind this
demand. The driving concern behind cosmopolitanism is the protection of
human rights. And, as many proponents of human rights increasingly
acknowledge, human rights are not merely claims against the state, but
they depend on the state for their enforcement." ° Cosmopolitanism and
nationalism can thus coexist, provided, ofcourse, that nationalism does not
entail the hard-edged exclusivity that Dinh's patriotism appears to
contemplate. " 0
And yet, although Dinh fails to acknowledge it, there is a fundamental
sense in which his prescription of patriotism as an effective response to
international terrorism derives from an understanding of reality that is
similar to the cosmopolitan outlook. Cosmopolitanism is a product of the
globalization process that became markedly pronounced following the
disintegration at the end of the 1980s of the Soviet Union as a credible
competing center of power. Francis Fukuyama, in his seminal work,
captured the zeitgeist when he called the period "the end of history. ' "' By
triumphing over communism, liberalism had demonstrated that it was the
culturally determined secular religion of not only the advanced industrial
countries of Western Europe and North America, but of all societies. Both
Dinh and the cosmopolitans take it as a given that their ideals will operate
and be guided by this zeitgeist. Dinh's patriotism simply names the reality
for what it is: a regime of American exceptionalism within an ostensibly
international order. The cosmopolitan outlook would prefer to avoid

107. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 86, at 109-10; HOBSBAWM, supra note 85, at 136.
108. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 92, at 9.
109. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization,and Human
Rights, Et Cetera,68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1,7 (1999); Henry J. Steiner, Three Cheersfor Universal
Jurisdiction-OrIs It Only Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQumIES L. 199, 211-12 (2004); Henry J.
Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1543-44 (1991).
110. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
111. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992)
(arguing that liberal democracy and free market capitalism, as the most fundamentally satisfying
form of government and economy, represent the final stage of human government).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 5 [2004], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAWREVIE[W

•906

[V/ol. 56

explicit acknowledgement of that reality by cloaking it in much more
neutral sounding terminology." 2
This is not a new dilemma. In more ways than Professors Dinh and
Nussbaum might care to admit, the patriotism/cosmopolitanism dichotomy
is reminiscent of the split among international communists in the 1930s.
"Liberal democracy" assumed in the 1990s the sort of universalist moral
and :intellectual iconography" 3 that has been rivaled only by the sway that
international communism held over elites in the 1930s. Just as
international communism during that decade was split between those who,
on the one hand, saw it simply as a tool for extending the hegemony of the
Soviet Union and the defense of the "motherland" Russia, and those who,
on the other hand, viewed it as a vehicle for spreading the "proletarian
revolution" and the entailed ideal of "universal egalitarianism," "liberal
democracy" (and the frequently associated norms of "rule of law," "human
rights," and even "the free market") came to serve the mutual interests of
the American patriots and the cosmopolitan internationalists. The result is
what has come to be known as "liberal internationalism," by which is
meant the governing of the international system by self-proclaimed
"liberal" intellectuals. 4 The ultimate difficulty with cosmopolitanism is
that, as followers of Trotsky and the Comintern found out in the 1930s, it
is the realists who get to have the last laugh.
Realists are bound to win out for a simple reason: human nature,
especially its perception of"self-interest," whether rational or sentimental.
Loyalty may be driven as well by fear as by love, and by greed as by
selflessness; what is indisputable is that loyalty is owed to some tangible
thing or person. For unquestioning loyalty to transcend an immediate
temporal exigency, it must be institutionalized-almost always through

112. Cf Benjamin R. Barber, ConstitutionalFaith, in NUSSBAUM, supra note 92, at 31-33.
Barber notes:
American national identity has from the start been a remarkable mixture of
cosmopolitan and parochialism.
...
[Nussbaum] seems diffident in the face of the actual ideals that animate
American patriotism-however little realized they may be. Yet it is precisely
these ideals that give parochial America its global appeal, these ideals that
afforded Lincoln the opportunity to claim that America might yet be the "last best
hope" for people everywhere, these ideals that draw peoples damaged by toxic
patriotisms elsewhere to American shores.

Id.
113.

See, e.g., BRUCE RussETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE(1993).

114. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, ANEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (discussing the New
World Order as governance through a complex global web of government networks).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss5/2

24

Chibundu: For God, For Country, For Universalism: Sovereignty as Solidarity
DUNWODY COMAMETARY

lifelong subliminal indoctrination." 5 Humanity is an abstraction, not an
institution. The state, the family, the school, or the next-door-neighbor, on
the other hand, represent tangible institutions. These can command-loyalty
over time because they have particular meaning for the individual-.fi6m
whom loyalty is demanded. Reciprocity-whether direct or indirect,
contemporaneous or "banked for the future"--is the primary driving fdrce
behind loyalty," 6 and reciprocal relationships can only be established with
institutions or persons-with those capable of reciprocating with
incentives or disincentives. The relationship of the individual to the state
is readily a forum for the reciprocal exchange of protection and loyalty-a
relationship that is not easily approximated in the context of dealings
between the individual and humanity at large.
V. TERRORISM AND THE POST-MODERN LIBERAL STATE

Thus far, in arguing that neither reversion to "patriotism" nor
acceptance of the "cosmopolitan outlook" constitutes an appropriate
response to the challenges of contemporary terrorism, I have gone along
with Dinh's basic premise that terrorism threatens the nation-state in
fundamental ways. He adduces little evidence for this assertion. Here, I
shall explain why that premise is wrong.
Preliminarily, it may be worth stating what the arguments that follow
are not about. This response does not contest the right of a state to identify
and strike back at the identified terrorists, nor of the citizens of the state to
revel in and use whatever force they may have at their disposal in doing
so. While my own preference may be for the use of law and legal
proceedings, that preference is not what I seek to defend here. The issue
that I seek to develop is the extent to which a society-and, more
particularly, the American polity-in the name of a generalized "threat"
posed by terrorism to its identity and constitution as a state, is free to
employ whatever means it determines to be appropriate to maintain its
status as a state. I contend first that "terrorism" as a concept poses no
fundamental challenge to the modem liberal state and secondly, that the
two suggested cures of militarism and patriotism do more harm than good.

115. Professor Nussbaum argues that public education can be successfully employed to
inculcate primary loyalty to the human being. See Nussbaum, supra note 92, at 11-12. For the
reasons that follow, I doubt that abstract classroom learning can overcome the lessons of daily
experienced, interdependent relationships between individuals and the concrete institutions with
which they routinely interact.
116. 1 have explored these points in the context of the development of the state in Africa. See
Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, GourdingandServing Palm-Wine, 29
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167, 247-48 (1997).
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It is a commonplace observation-one that hardly requires citation to
authority' 7 --that for Americans, an event or an idea almost always
becomes significant only when it is felt or otherwise perceived as being
relevant to the life of the country." 8 Whether this is an expression of
innocence or of hubris is inconsequential for the purposes of this
Commentary. What matters is that as in much else, the insularity of
Americans to the problem of transnational terrorism was shattered on
September 11, 2001. That experience transformed a problem hitherto
barely acknowledged into one of transcendent importance, in the mastery
of which all other priorities had to be set aside." 9 The observer is thus
confronted with two issues. First, identifying with some precision what is
distinctive about the challenge to the nation-state posed by international
terrorism as carried out on September 11, and second, the extent to which
the total mobilization of a national population is the optimal response to
the challenge.
We may start with an observation. Because international terrorism, like
all terrorism, involves the use of violence, it presents a challenge to the
nation-state's desire to monopolize or otherwise be the sole arbiter of the
appropriate use of violence. But this challenge is not unique to
international terrorism. All violent criminals and vigilantes, let alone
domestic terrorists, unofficial paramilitary organizations, and guerrilla
groups, routinely present this challenge. What counts has never been the
mere presence of the challenge, but rather the capacity and efficacy of the
state successfully to meet the challenge, preferably without the sort of fullscale popular mobilization that wearing patriotism on one's sleeve entails.
Moreover, in measuring the scope of the threat, the yardstick cannot be
whether the state can completely eradicate international terrorism, 2 ° but
rather whether the state is capable of keeping the threat of international
terrorism to that of an occasional event, so that the nationals of the state
117. But if one is really needed, then take a look at Ronald Steel, FightFire with Fire, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 25, 2004, § 7, at 13 (book review) ("[Terrorism] is new to Americans because nothing
is truly real until it happens to us."). This communal self-centeredness, it should be said, may well
be the essence of patriotism, and so understood, Americans are extremely patriotic. See generally
Pei, supra note 84 (rightly pointing out that if "patriotism" is properly understood as socially
ordered rather than state-sponsored, Americans are as patriotic as any national group); Martha C.
Nussbaum, Introductionto NUSSBAUM, supranote 92, at xi (describing the ubiquitous chant of"US-A U-S-A" at sporting activities). Few other societies require their children to pledge allegiance
to the flag every school day.
118. President Bush was reflecting the national character when he informed the United Nations
on Sept. 12, 2002 that if the international body did not act in accordance with the prescriptions of
the United States, the United Nations would become "irrelevant." See President George W. Bush,
Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New
York (Sept. 12, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/
09/20020912- l.html).
119. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
120. The state has not eradicated either bank robbery or piracy on the high seas.
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view its occurrence as an aberration subject to effective policing. And, of
course, we must inquire into the effectiveness of suggested state
actions-warfare, law enforcement, and/or patriotic mobilization-which
are best calculated to yield this result at minimal socio-political and
economic costs to the system.
There are three identifiable ways in which the events of September 11
have been seen as presenting unique challenges to the nation-state
generally and to the United States in particular. First, because modem
terrorists now have at their disposal such phenomenal technological
capacity to inflict destruction on contemporary nation-states, they should
be seen as posing a challenge different in kind from that of their
predecessors' 2 ' and comparable only to the challenge that one state has
always posed to another, namely that of annihilation, or at least significant
alteration, of the boundaries of their relationships.' Second, modem
terrorism (or, at least, that presented by al Qaeda), is driven by so
implacable a hatred of the values of liberal democracy that no coexistence
between the two is possible. The liberal democratic state is thus faced with
a simple choice: its own annihilation or the annihilation of the terrorist. 23
Third, the terrorism that is of special concern to the state is that from
without.' 24 This may be because under the liberal democratic rules of the
game, outsiders should have no say in how politics is practiced within a
liberal society and/or because the foreign terrorist is always a willing tool
of a foreign state. If these are meritorious claims, then a response that
seeks to heighten national self-consciousness may well prove to be
appropriate. But they are hardly meritorious.
At a basic level, it might be observed that none of these claims directly
challenges the idea of the state, even as defined under the Montevideo
Convention.'25 Terrorism in and of itself does not speak to the existence
121. Cf Bassiouni, supra note 37, at 83 ("The differences between [terrorism's] various
manifestations, however, have been as to methods, means, and weapons. As the means available
to inflict significant damage to society improve, the harmful impact of terrorism increases. And as
weapons of mass destruction become more accessible, the dangers to the world community
increase.").
122. See Dinh, supra note 10, at 869. It is worth pointing out, however, that the claim that the
consequence of victory by one state over another must be the dismemberment of the latter is one
of those conventional wisdoms that close factual investigation disproves. See, e.g., Peter Gowan,
A Calculusof Power, 16 NEW LEFr REV. 47, 52-53 (2002) (stating that in the modem (as opposed
to the feudal) era, Germany is about the only case in which a defeated great power has been
disembodied, and even this has proved to be temporary).
123. Dinh, supra note 10, at 868 ("[T]here are people out there who would not only reject our
institutions, ideals, and values, but who also find them so offensive that they would give up their
lives to take the lives of innocents and to upend all that we hold dear.").
124. See id. at 869. The extensive use of immigration laws as an anti-terror weapon in both
the United States and the United Kingdom makes the same point. See supranote 79.
125. See Dinh, supra note 10, at 871-72.
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(or right of existence) of a population within defined territorial boundaries
under a government capable of establishing and maintaining international
relationships with other states. The reason is quite simple. Terrorism is
neither an ideology, an entity, nor a movement. It is simply a means or a
tool that is wielded for highly diverse purposes, including sometimes
futhering the asserted objectives of a state.2 6 Terrorism is no more
entitled to being assigned an animating cognitive existence than a gun or
a knife is. It is one thing to declare communism or fascism an enemy and
quite another thing to view terrorism as possessing the same sort of
independent substantive existence. Nonetheless, let us play along with the
rhetoric and see what can be said about terrorism as an enemy of the state.
There is no caviling the potency or easy availability of the modem
technologies of destruction. Occurring in Washington and New York,
centers of the global media networks, the September 11 attacks and the
coverage that they received illuminated a reality that persons in as diverse
societies as those of East Africa, the Middle-East, South-East Asia, and
Western Europe had experienced quite a few times. Indeed, the massive
injuries that terror attacks can inflict on a society were not unknown even
in the United States. Six years earlier, Oklahoma, in the heartland of the
country, witnessed a massive terrorist attack, admittedly locally grown
rather than external. Moreover, beyond the fear of the injuries actually
wrought by these modem technologies is the fertile imagination as to the
devastation they are capable of inflicting. If nineteen relatively
unsophisticated, knife-carrying and box cutter-wielding Arabs could cause
the damages of September 11, then is there any limit to the capacity of
haters of America armed with nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological
weapons to disable the country? The answer surely is "no." It is thus better
to confront such persons and their sponsors on their own streets and in
their own caves than to have to confront them in the streets, malls, or
sporting stadia of this country.' On its face, this would appear to be a

126. As Caleb Carr has pointed out, it is difficult to call the deliberate targeting of
civilians-even in a time of war-as anything but terrorism. See CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF
TERROR 6 (2002).
127. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 7, 2003) (transcript
available at http://www.white.gov/news/releases/20O3/09/print/20030907- .html). The President
stated:
We have learned that terrorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength; they
are invited by the perception of weakness. And the surest way to avoid attacks on
our own people is to engage the enemy where he lives and plans. We are fighting
that enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan today so that we do not meet him again on our
own streets, in our own cities.
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powerful motivation for patriotism. The need to wage a "war" is not here
metaphorical, but literal. Because terrorists supposedly are likely to be
armed with weapons of mass destruction, the state must confront them
with as lethal an arsenal that it can bring to bear as it would in any total
.I
war.
But this response obscures the lessons of history and the fact that above
all else, the state is a social institution that is also regulated by legal
concepts. While we may viscerally recoil at the level of damage caused by
the September 11 attacks, the use of modem technologies in causing those
injuries did not itself present a novel challenge to society at large or to the
state. In fact, terrorists at all times have availed themselves of the most
advanced technologies of their-time. 28 Similarly, societies at all times
have countered by identifying and developing effective technological
countermeasures. 2 1 Policing, rather than warfare or mass arousal of
passions, has proved to be the more appropriate response, 3 ° and there is
nothing in the modem technologies likely to be employed by terrorists that
indicates that the state ought to respond any differently. To the contrary,
it is precisely in the efficacy of its policing function-legitimation of
power and morals through the adoption, interpretation and enforcement of
laws-that the state establishes its preeminence over competing social
institutions.
Contrary to the revisionist theorizing in the 1990s on the pacific
proclivities of liberal democratic societies,"' it is quite common-in fact,
128. Thus, for example, in 1605, Guy Fawkes and his fellow conspirators sought to employ
gunpower (at that time a technological novelty) in what today would be termed an act of terror
against King James I and British parliament. See, e.g., ANTONIAFRASER, FAITHANDTREAsON: THE
STORY OF THE GUNPOWDER PLOT (1996). Similarly, the "Anarchists," who were the quintessential
terrorists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries employed the advanced technologies of their
time, including the bomb and the rifle. And, of course, our own age of terror-9/1 I not
withstanding--readily can be said to have commenced with the multiple hijackings in 1970 of
Boeing 747s (then the epitome of modem technology) by Palestinian guerrillas.
129. The leitmotif of two works of fiction written at a time when the scourge of terrorism last
commanded the sort of mass fear that it does today is instructive on this point. See G. K.
CHESTERTON, THE MAN WHO WAS THURSDAY (American House 1908); JOSEPH CONRAD, THE
SECRETAGENT (Random House modem library paperback ed. 1998). Both highlight the simple but
eternal verities that our contemporary "war" on terrorism wantonly overlooks: the misguided
tendency to equate passion with information, the importance of investigation over assumption, and
the reality of the human costs that precipitous action invariably imposes on the not-so-privileged
members of the community. For an exchange on the possible contours of legal responses to
September 11, see, for example, Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALEL. J. 1871, 1871-74
(2004); David Cole, The PriorityofMorality: The Emergency Constitution'sBlindSpot, 113 YALE
L. J.1753, 1758-59 (2004).
130. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
131. 1have evaluated the cogency 6fthis theorizing elsewhere. See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, The
Other in International Law: 'Community' and International Legal Order, U. of Md., Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 2004-03 (draft, 2004) (especially nn. 29-31 and accompanying text); see also
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all-too-frequent-for the United States to resort to war as a standard
problem-solving tool.' The costs of warfare, however, make its use a
maximalist policy. It can only be sustained for a comparatively short
period of time. But while democratic institutions do not effectively check
the tendency to make war, they are quite powerful checks on the capacity
of the state to sustain that war for an extended period of time.'33 The nature
of terrorism-its systemic reliance on stealth, the diffuseness of the
weaponry at its disposal, and its willingness to strike indiscriminately at
the weak points of a society-assure that conflicts with it are likely to be
long-lasting."' This demands patience and a resort to those social
institutions that can be sustained over a long period of time. Neither war
nor a heightened sense of patriotism survives manipulation over extended
periods of time. The administration of law and of policing are more
tailored to such undertakings, and they are singularly within the control of
the state.
Integrated into the shock felt by Americans following September 11
was the desire to frame the victimization of the country by asking and
answering the question: "Why do they hate us?" But while the politician
and the proverbial American people might derive solace from the
assurance of such bland responses as that "they" envy our power, wealth,
pursuit of happiness, easy-going life-style, freedom of consumption and
religion, equality of the sexes, constitutional protections, and civilization,
crafting a reasoned response to this inquiry presents a genuine dilemma for
the liberal internationalist. First, neither terror nor terrorism represents a
substantive ideology. Rather, they are means for realizing substantive
ends. To ask and answer the question why those who employ them "hate
us" is to inquire into substantive motivations, which, for the liberal
intemationalist (as for liberalism, generally), opens the Pandora's box of
judgment-making about substantive values. Second, even the most cursory
evaluation of these virtuous answers reveals them as being at best banal,

JOANNE GOWA, BALLOTS AND BULETs: THE ELUSIVE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1999) (arguing that,

as an empirical matter, the claim that "democracies" do not go to war with each other holds true
only for the short period of the Cold War and is attributable not to any inherent characteristics of
democracy, but to a coincidence of interest that may or may not persist in the post-Cold War
international relations environment).
132. See, e.g., MAX BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF

AMERICAN POWER (2002) (discussing the American tradition of fighting small wars to resolve
conflicts). There is no American exceptionalism at work here. See generallyJOHN J. MEARSHEIMER,
THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2003) (illustrating the different strategies that the "great
powers" use to advance their interests).
133. See Chibundu, supra note 131, at nn. 42-46.
134. And so, we are routinely and believably told that this "new kind of war" with terrorism
is one of indefinite duration against uncertain targets and unknown persons and with no yardstick
for measuring success.
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and quite likely, dangerously solipsistic. These answers say a good deal
more about our perception of ourselves than they do about our
understanding of the terrorist, let alone the terrorist's understanding of our
society. In any event, their focus is not on the terrorist's relationship or
challenge to the state but on our imagination of the driving ideology
behind a particular group of terrorists, those whom we converiiently
classify as "al Qaeda."
It is now uniformly asserted that the September 11 attacks were
perpetrated by al Qaeda, an entity having transnational reach. In many
minds, al Qaeda has become synonymous with international terrorism. But
explaining who or what constitutes al Qaeda is a much more problematic
undertaking.' Beyond the association with one of its purported founders,
Osama bin Laden,'36 there is little agreement as to what constitutes al
Qaeda. Is it an organization, a network of organizations, or simply an
ideology, i.e., a way of looking at the world? Who or what funds it? Who,
if anyone, determines its policies? And, indeed, what are its objectives and
policies? Reasonably concrete answers to these questions are essential if
one is to decide whether al Qaeda poses more than a transient threat to the
United States. In other words, is the conflict with al Qaeda any different
in kind from the quite ubiquitous conflicts that governments have had (and
continue to have) with violent outlaw organizations such as the Mafia and
drug cartels, or such ideologically driven revolutionary groups as the
Weather Underground, Red Army, Red Brigade, the Baader-Meinhoff
Group or even the provisional IRA? Whatever their propensities and
capabilities for violence may be, these organizations have not been seen
as representing fundamental challenges to the state, certainly not
sufficiently so to compel the sort of total mobilization of state resources
and peoples that the "war" metaphor or the call to patriotism demand.
We can, of course, try to elide having to quantify the particularities of
the threat that al Qaeda poses by focusing not on al Qaeda, but abstractly
on that for which it purportedly stands. Here, the handy invocation of
terms such as "Jihadists," "militant," "fundamentalist," or "radical" Islam
superficially comes to the rescue.' Aside from their association with the
religion of Islam, however, these terms hardly convey more information

135. For a quasi-official description of al Qaeda, see THE 9/1 COMM'N REPORT, supra note

2, at 47-70.
136. See id. at 55-57.
137. See, e.g., id. at 362 (asserting that the war is against "extremist Islam"); see also YOSSEF
BODANSKY, BIN LADEN: THE MAN WHO DECLARED WAR ON AMERICA (2001) (examining the
relationship between the extemist elements in the Muslim world, their leaders, and the more visible
figures, such as Osama bin Laden); BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ISLAM (Modem Library ed.,
2003) (discussing different forms of Islamic extremism).
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than the term "al Qaeda"-or terrorism, for that matter.'38 The easiest way
to avoid the ambiguities and amorphousness of these terms would be to
ignore the adjectives and simply charge terrorism as the product of Islam,
a religion whose fundamental tenets and beliefs are well-known.'39 And
occasionally, some prominent and not-so-prominent Americans have done
so.4 If Islam were equated with international terror, or if international
terror were seen as a scimitar in the service of Islam (a proposition not
infrequently subliminally conveyed in the rhetorical references to "Islamic
fundamentalism"), 4 ' then the Islamic of Ummah (that is, of a community
of believers) might be seen genuinely to pose a threat to the nation-state,
at least as classically understood and developed in the West.'42 Such an
equation of Islam with terrorism is not only factually difficult to sustain,
but also poses difficult intellectual and political dilemmas for the
intelligentsia of liberal internationalism and of Western democratic
societies.
Putting aside the profound practical and geopolitical problems inherent
in waging a war of whatever kind against over one billion people for
whom Islam is no less important than Judaism, Christianity, or secularism
is for many Americans, and despite the willingness of some American
intellectuals to speak of the clash of civilizations,'43 defining the terrorist
threat along such a blunt religious or cultural cleavage contradicts a

138. See, e.g., Caleb Carr, Wrong Definitionfor a War, WASH. POST, July 28, 2004, at A19.
139. This assertion of course does not deny the existence of differences within Islam, nor is
it intended to overlook the complexities of a religion and civilization that embraces Black Africans
as readily as Iranians, and which has followers on all the continents. But notwithstanding nearly
a millennium and a half of history, there are basic tenets of the faith that have transcended time,
space, and language, and which are unique to it. See generally MARSHALL G; S. HODGSON, THE
VENTURE OF ISLAM: CONSCIENCE AND HISTORY INA WORLD CIVILIZATION (1974) (discussing
Islamic cultures and ideals).
140. See, e.g., Notebook, NEW REPUBUC, Jan. 21, 2002, at 8 (reporting that the prominent
Christian evangelists, the Reverends Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, had viewed the September
II attacks and their provoked responses in Messianic terms); see also Seymour M. Hersh, Moving
Targets: Willthe Counter-InsurgencyPlanin IraqRepeatthe Mistakes of Vietnam?,NEW YORKER,
Dec. 15, 2003, at 48 (reporting that a senior Pentagon official in whom Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
continues to have confidence had equated the Muslim world with "Satan," and that Satan wants to
destroy this nation as a "Christian army").
141. See, e.g., BODANSKY, supra note 137, at 104 (examining how fundamentalist Islam
shaped bin Laden as the supreme ideologue).
142. Cf THE 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 562 n.4.
143. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER (1996). As Samuel Huntington's later book demonstrates, there is in fact an
intellectual connection between narrow patriotism and subscription to the belief in the likelihood
of "a clash of civilizations." SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? (2004). Both concepts rely
heavily on cultural differentiation as the building block of a national community. Sources of
culture, of course, can range widely, varying from language to religion, to socio-political beliefs,
and to ideologies.
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mainstay of liberalism. Since at least the Enlightenment era, the need for
the state to remain neutral in the religious beliefs and practices of those
over whom it rules has been a cornerstone of liberal thought.' The need
to maintain this distance is particularly acute in an environment in which5
the same intelligentsia increasingly argues for universal human rights14
However much virtue may be found in secular humanist or "JudeoChristian" norms, the liberal internationalist is uncomfortable with the
appearance of Western hegemonic power being employed against Islam,
and this is especially so in view of the sizeable population of Muslims
whose citizenship and loyalty are claimed by Western countries.
Moreover, Islamic societies have demonstrated as much unalloyed
commitment to the organizational role of the state as have any other group
of peoples. The concept of the ummah proved to be ineffectual in attempts
to merge Egypt and Sudan or to create a United Arab Republic of Syria
and Egypt. 146 Kuwaitis proved to be just as resistant to having their state
absorbed by Iraq as Bangladeshis were to becoming part of Pakistan.147 A
common religious faith has not rendered the likes of Afghanistan and
Algeria any more or less of a state than Roman Catholicism has Spain or
Italy. Religion in these cases is only one component of the glue that seeks
to bind societies into states. Sometimes it works; sometimes it is
overridden by other forces including language and ancestral family ties.
In short, to equate international terrorism with Islam has the potential
for presenting a paradoxical challenge to liberal societies. It is a challenge

144. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution captures the essence of this
liberal doctrine. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Of course, the "separation of church and state" is not a
pristine doctrine, and its application in particular cases continues to generate substantial debate, as
evidenced by the recent litigation in the United States over whether the state can require
impressionable children to recite the "Pledge of Allegiance" which includes the word "God," and
in France whether the state can bar Muslim girls from wearing the "hijab" in public schools. See
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2305 (2004); cf. Pierre T6vanian,
BANNING THE HIJAB: Say No To Racial Discrimination,LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Eng. Ed.),
Feb. 2004 (arguing against exclusion of Muslim girls from French schools because of their wearing
of the hijab); Henri Pefla-Ruiz, BANNING THE HIJAB: Say Yes to a Secular France,LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE (Eng. Ed.), Feb. 2004 (arguing that the prohibition of the wearing of the hijab is
central to French secularism, which in turn is essential to the functioning of law and freedom in
French society).
145. See, e.g., The UniversalDeclarationof HumanRights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 71, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948); The InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/6136
(1966).
146. See, e.g., ALBERT H. HOURANI & MALISE RUTVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES
401-15 (2d ed. 2002).
147. See BADRUDDIN UMAR, THE EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH: CLASS STRUGGLES iN EAST
PAKISTAN, 1947-1958 (2004) (documenting a broad range of Bangladeshi resistance to becoming
part of Pakistan).
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less of physical violence to the state from without than it is to the
intellectual coherence of liberal thought. 48 Indeed, that challenge and the
increasing failure with which it has been met are evident in the increasing
derogation by Western societies from hitherto unquestioned civil and
human rights practices such as suppression of speech, framing of guilt by
association, mass roundups of "suspects," indefinite and unexplained
detentions, denial of counsel, secret trials, and even resort to the use of
extrajudicial killings. 49 To the extent that the modem liberal state is
supposed to reflect a bargain between accountable governmental power
and communal loyalty or patriotism, the tradeoff is now greatly in favor
of state authority.
Faced with these challenges to the soul of liberalism, one way to avoid
the import of the shift in power relationships has been to draw a distinction
between the citizen and the non-citizen. Professor Viet Dinh does as much
when he invites us to view terrorism in bifurcated terms. The terrorism that
counts, he tells us, is that perpetrated by the foreigner, which may
legitimately be countered, therefore, by the arousal of patriotism. "oHe is
not alone in these sentiments. In litigating the propriety of employing
arbitrary and indefinite detention as a tool in the war against terrorism, the
United States government, its British ally and indeed their human rights
opponents saw as a basic and necessary distinction the citizenship of the
Defendant. The foreign citizen, argued the United States government,
could be detained indefinitely and subjected to whatever minimal
procedure (if any) the President deemed appropriate,' while conceding
that a United States citizen might be entitled to test the legality of his
detention through a habeas corpus proceeding.' 52 Similarly, the British
government authorized the indefinite detention of foreigners under its
"Antiterrorist Act""' while readily acknowledging that British citizens
could not be detained indefinitely, but must be accorded a prompt judicial

148. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR (2002).
149. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
150. Dinh, supra note 10, at 881-82.
151. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, President Issues Military Order, (Nov. 13, 2001),
availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001 /11/20011113-27.html.
152. See Oral Arguments at 21, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (No. 03-334), available
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral arguments/argumenttranscripts.html. That the United
States Supreme Court ultimately rejected this position does not detract from the argument in the
text. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 2693-98. But see id. at 2701-11. (Scalia J., dissenting)
(contending that the government is entitled to make this distinction.) And indeed, notwithstanding
Rasul, the Government continues to claim that whatever right to habeas corpus aliens may have,
it does not include the right to counsel in such proceedings. See Neil A. Lewis, New Fight on
GuantdnamoRights, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2004, at Al 8.
153. See supra note 79.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss5/2

34

Chibundu: For God, For Country, For Universalism: Sovereignty as Solidarity
DUNWODY COM4ENTARY

hearing.' 54 And, in litigating the scope of presidential power to deprive a
detainee of the right to counsel, civil rights proponents in the United States
relied heavily on a purported distinction between the citizen whose right
to counsel was argued to be unalienable, and the non-citizen whose right
presumably could be dispensed with at the whim of the government.'
But accepting the invitation to view terrorism through the prism of the
citizen and the outsider is just as detrimental to "liberal international
order" as is one founded on exploiting religious fissures. In the first place,
the double standard inherent in the approach 56 undercuts yet another
cornerstone of modem liberalism and indeed of international law norms.
The idea of equal treatment, it is fair to say, has as much a claim to being
at the core of contemporary liberalism as any other concept.' Of course,
154. See Upton, supra note 79. Upton notes:
This Government has added a further dimension to the UK's anti-terror
legislation. Instead of using the criminal law as its basis, it has arrived at the
solution ofgrafting anti-terrorist provisions onto immigration law. This means that
there is no duty of disclosure, no legal aid available to the accused--and none of
the safeguards provided by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act apply. The
checks to the power of the state in the form of due process, available in the
criminal justice system, weakened though they might be in the case of terrorist
legislation, do not exist at all under immigration law
"The flaw in the legislation is that it only applies to foreign nationals. UK
nationals cannot be detained under it. What has happened is the same as has
happened at Guantanamo Bay-a 'Brit Cit' cannot be detained but a foreigner can
be interned."
Id. at 6-7 (quoting Shami Chakrabarti).
155. See, e.g., Oral Arguments at 7-8, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 036696), availableat http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts.html; see
also Oral Arguments at 28-33, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (No. 03-1027),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oraLarguments/argument.transcripts.html. The
United States government is in accord:
The Justice Department said in a federal court filing on Friday that prisoners
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who were seeking to file petitions challenging their
detentions were not entitled to access to their lawyers to do so.
The department said the prisoners were not entitled to see their lawyers
because they were foreigners held outside the jurisdiction of the United States.
Lewis, supra note 152, at A18.
156. See generallyDAVID CoLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTIUTONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERORiSM (2003) (arguing that, in balancing liberty and security, the
United States has consistently relied on a double standard by imposing measures on foreigners that
United States citizens would not tolerate if applied to all persons equally).
157. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LBERALISMANDTmELIMas OFJUSTICE(1982) (critiquing
the proceduralist bent in liberal democratic theory).
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this conclusion does not mean that societies may not engage in rational
classifications. But the burden of explaining the reasonableness of a
classification surely falls on the classifier. It may be that, however
debatable, distinguishing between Muslims and Christians or Arabs and
Africans in the fight against terror can be defended rationally on
prophylactic or precautionary grounds.' It may also be rational for the
United States to insist that only its nationals or citizens work as baggage
inspectors at its airports.' But it is a good deal more difficult to explain
on rational grounds a blanket distinction between the national and the
outsider in identifying who constitutes a terrorist. This is especially so if,
as I have argued, there is no inherent conflict between the concept of the
state and the use of terror.16
The injustice of the dichotomy is sharpened by the emergence of an
opposite trend in the commercial arena. In recent years, the United
States-and the West generally-has employed its preponderant global
economic power to enshrine as a matter of both conventional and
normative international law that it is (or should be) impermissible for
national governments to discriminate between nationals and foreigners in
the extension of legal protection to their investments.' 6' The position has
gained significant international adherence in recent years. 62 It would
indeed be manifestly hypocritical to maintain that nationality ought to play
a decisive role in determining the process due one whose liberty is to be
extinguished but not one whose property is to be taken.
A second ground for approaching with diffidence the loyal
patriot/outsider divide in the fight against terrorism is that its byproduct

158. See, e.g., Lynette Clemetson, HomelandSecurity Given Dataon Arab-Americans,N.Y.
TIMEs, July 30, 2004, at A14 (reporting that in response to requests from the Border and Customs
Protection Division of the Department of Homeland Security, the Census Bureau has provided
specially tabulated population statistics on Arab-Americans, "including detailed information on
how many people of Arab backgrounds live in certain ZIP codes .... sorted by country of origin");
see generally SEPTEMBER 11 INHISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT, supra note. 10 (evaluating the
rationality of differential treatment among American citizens in the war against terrorism).
159. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 44935(e)(ii) (West Supp. 2004).
160. See supra note 125-26 and accompanying text. The argument in the text, of course, does
not challenge the individualized treatment of persons suspected to be "terrorists."
161. See, e.g., Saamir Elshihabi, The Difficulty Behind Securing Sector-Specific Investment
Establishment Rights: The Case of the Energy Charter Treaty, 35 INT'L LAW. 137 (2001)
(suggesting that the right to invest should be extended to foreigners as well as nationals); Kenneth
J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. INT'L L. J. 469, 500

(2000) (suggesting that non-discrimination against foreign investment is a notable accomplishment
of bilateral investment treaties).
162. See, e.g., Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 64 (July 20); A.F.M.
Maniruzzaman, Expropriationof Alien Property and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in
InternationalLaw of ForeignInvestment: An Overview, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L. L. & POL'Y 57, 57-58
(1998).
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may well be to vitiate one of the strengths of the modem state. As I have
explained, the state has become the dominant institution of our age largely
because of its flexibility and adaptability. 63 This attribute has been evident
as much in the development of membership criteria as elsewhere," 'and
no modem state has been as flexible in this regard as the United States.
Here, we are met with a paradox. Although nationalism (especially its
variant, so-called "ethno-nationalism") is often pejoratively presented as
a closed system that is grounded on consanguinity, 6 ' most modem states
in fact have opened up and are continuing to broaden the grounds for
admittance and national membership. This is true not only of former
imperial states like France and the United Kingdom, or "settler" states
such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, but also even of hitherto
highly nationalistic and ostensibly homogeneous societies like the Federal
Republic of Germany.' For all of these societies, flexible immigration
rules have proved to be essential in order to accommodate the changing
character of the state, whether in order to absorb the detritus of
decolonization and Cold War policies or to meet new demands for labor
in a post-industrial age.
Nor is national membership to be viewed narrowly in terms of
citizenship alone. To the contrary, reinforcing its tendencies towards
flexibility and institutional accommodation, the modem state seeks to
satisfy the utilitarian needs of its varied constituencies by permitting and
encouraging varying levels of participation. Thus, in the context of the
United States, for example, citizenship might be acquired passively
through birth or actively through the process of naturalization.' 67 Those
who are not citizens may nonetheless actively participate in the communal
life of the society as "permanent residents."'68 To insist on a dichotomy
between the "citizen/patriot" and the non-citizen is not only to overlook
the complexities of the relationships that exist within the modem state, but
also to inject a potentially detrimental roadblock to the flexible machinery
that has made the state the efficacious social institution that it has become.

163. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
165. Compare ANTHONY W. MARX, FAITH IN NATION: EXCLUSIONARY ORIGINS OF
NATIONALISM (2003) (demonstrating that European nationalism, no less than contemporary "Third
World" nationalism, was as much the product of exclusionary politics as it was of shared or
enlightened solidarity), with Chibundu, supra note 131 (arguing that the exclusion of the "other"
is in fact essential to the formation of any community, including that of the nation state).
166. See GERMAN EMBASSY (LONDON), REFORM OF GERMANY'S

CITIZENSHIP AND

NATIONALITY LAW (2000), at http://www.german-embassy.org.uk/reformof germany_s_
citizenshi.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
167. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
168. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(20), 1255, 1427 (West 2004).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Like poverty, "patriotism" and "terrorism," shall always be with us.
The challenge that contemporary societies face is the minimization of their
destructive consequences. The challenge is both moral and political. As a
legal academic with primary interest in international law, my preference
is that societies employ, as much as feasible, legal tools in coming to terms
with the challenge of international terrorism.' 69 It is impossible, however,
to ignore the role that fear plays in conditioning societal responses and the
fact that law often falls flat in the face of such challenges. But the notion
that patriotism responsibly can be brought to bear on the problem of
international terrorism seems to require not only that we ignore history,
but also that we suspend our rational faculties. Can one really watch the
recent news items of Afghans in barely seaworthy boats being denied
landing by well-equipped naval ships and not recall incidents of Jewish
and Vietnamese refugees being treated similarly? Is it really the case that
our humanity today is so fundamentally more advanced and civilized that
we need not acknowledge the base human proclivities manifest in the
abuse of power at Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib? Liberal democratic
societies may well be responsive to the push and thrust of the citizenry in
whose name state power is exercised. Liberal democracy has yet to breed
self-centeredness and fear of the unfamiliar and the outsider out of the
body politic. Until it does, let us accept patriotism as unavoidable but
allow it no more than the grudging recognition to which it may claim
entitlement by virtue of pedigree.

169. As a human being and citizen, I would prefer, of course, that governments and societies
seek to address the substantive issues that provide plausible justifications for terrorism.
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